This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives-to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger's hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behavior of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoralsystem coincides with the median party's position. On the other hand, with quasilinear utility, the.distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule.
Introduction
One of the main features of a representative democracy with a parliamentary system is the preeminent role that a coalition holding the majority of the votes in the Parliament plays in the determination of policy outcomes.^The agenda-setting power is always within the majority coalition, and the cabinet government is limited even in the realm of executive power by the need to maintain the support of the majority coalition itself. In other words, the policy outcomes of a parliamentary democracy are decided de facto by the majority coalition in the House(s). Thus, the legislative bargaining game determining the majority coalition is a very important one for any positive theory of the micro-political determination of economic policy (see Persson & Tabellini 1998b for the most recent account of this approach).
The players of the legislative bargaining game are usually not the individual legislators but the elected parties.^The number of parties represented in the Parliament and the distribution of seats among them affect, together with the ideological and political constraints on the formation of different coalitions, the negotiation process that leads to the formation of a majority coalition. But these crucial variables, i.e., the party structure and the distribution of seats, are obviously not exogenous to the institutional system:
1. For any given party structure, the distribution of seats is affected by, and varies with, the electoral system; 2. Within any given institutional system, the equilibrium party structure depends on the expected assignment of seats, and hence expected payoff, associated to each party structure.
These two relationships are very important, and have not been studied before. The in troduction of the process of party formation in any game-theoretic model of representative democracy allows us to deal with such relationships and is likely to determine predictions close to reality, since party formation is one of the main strategic activities of politicians.
' Persson and Tabellini (1998a) and (1998b) cire the first to emphasize the impact of the legislative cohesion typical of parliamentary systems on public policy, contrasting such a policy with that obtained in a presidentialcongressional system, which is diaracterized by less legislative cohesion and a greater separation of powers. Our paper focuses exclusively on parliamentary systems, and hence legislative cohesion is assumed throughout. Laver and Shepsle (1996) provide a rich formal model of government formation, where the emphasis is on the "composition" of the cabinet rather than on legislative bargaining.
In closed-list systems the electorate casts its ballot not for individual candidates but for party lists.
Moreover, the elimination of 'secret votes in the Houses of many democracies implies more discipline, or loyalty, within parties. The party leadership can usually enforce the party line by various kinds of implicit threats.
Moreover, if voters know the true ideological position of any party facing elections, then, since no contingent contract can be signed with the voters, a party is stuck with its own ideolo^cal position. A political elite can commit to a policy platform different from its own only by forming a party with some other elite, so that the platform votersexpect to be pursued by such a party is somewhere between those of the two elites. In other words, party formation gives political elites a way to "move" on.the policy spectrum.
One of the main contributions in the recent formal literature on representative democ racy is the work of Besley and Coate (1997) . In* the first stage of their three-stage game some agents choose to become, candidates, in the second stage the population votes for the candidates, aiid in the last stage the candidate who received the most votes makes policy choices. This is a goodrabstract description of what happens when one decision maker has to be elected, but it is not as relevant when the object of study is the formation of a coalitional government, especially if the electoral system is proportional. In contrast to Besley and Coate, our representative democracy game allows the consideration of a variety of electoral systems, as well as all possible divisions'of the electorate (into districts or constituencies) within a unified framework. For any given electoral system, the multi-stage coalition forma tion game introduced in this paper produces an equilibrium outcome, an equilibrium party structure, and an equilibrium government coalition: >> -The (ex post) coalition formation game involved in. forming a coalitional government is played all the time, in all parliamentary democracies. Even though the party structure has been fairly stable for long periods in many countries, coalition formation before elections (ex ante) takes place at importasnt historical-turning points, when a significant change in the rules of the overaU game occurs (among which the electoral system.is a crucial one), or when the political constraints or voters' preferences are altered.^Obviously, not all institutional changes determine a modification in.the equilibrium party structure; .however, it is important to emphasize the possible role of such c h a n g e s .
• Besides the explicit introduction of party formation and the possibility of comparing the effects of different electoral systems on equilibrium outcomes, this paper also provides some innovations in the way the ex post game is treated. This game among the elected memberŝ Italy is an example, where twice in the last 50 years. the party structure has changed dramaticcJIy-due to two difTerent structural breaks. After World War II a major institutional mutation occurred, and the party structure altered accordingly. In 1992, following (1) a change in theelectoral system (towards majoritarianism); (2) a relaxation of the constr^nts against forming coalitions with the former communists after 1989; and (3) a corruption scandal, which changed voters' preferences, a huge renegotiation process on parties started, and has not ended yet. A tendency towards a reduction of the number of parties (or joint lists) can ak-eady be noted. See Laver & Shepsle (1996) for other examples.^. ' , .
of Parliament has been studied extensively in the literature, and most of the work on this topic uses the non-cooperative sequential bargaining model of Baron k Ferejohn (1989) as a basic tool. The model of majoritarian bargaining used in this paper has more predictive power than the other models in the literature.'* The legislative majoritarian bargaining stagegame is modelled here as a non-cooperative sequential demand game, inspired by the work of Selten (1992) . The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium payoff allocation of the game is consistent with the empirical finding that, within the majority coalitions or the cabinets, ministerial payoffs and private benefits (like extra-ministerial patronage) are distributed proportionally according to the relative bargaining power given by the distribution of seats. In contrast, Baron & Ferejohn's model puts too much emphasis on "proposal power," i.e., the first mover in the order of play gets a disproportionate share, which is not confirmed by experimental evidence. In our model, when politicians have lexicographic preferences, the equilibrium distribution of payoffs within the winning coalition does not def)end on the order of play.
Another important feature of the sequential demand game used here is that there is a unique SPE distribution of payoffs for every distribution of seats, and hence it is possible to assign an expected payoff to each and every party for every party structure. This mapping allows us to study the incentives for party formation ex ante. With different electoral systems the same party structure can map into different distributions of weights, and hence different distributions of payoffs. Therefore the incentives for party formation will be sensitive to the choice of the el^toral system.
Duverger^a hypothesis is formally proved with our model. All the previous formal expla nations of Duverger's law and Duverger's hypothesis refer to strategic voting.^This paper shows that strategic voting is not necessary to obtain those conjectured relationships between electoral system and incentives for party formation.
As far as the equilibrium policy outcome is concerned, the relative performance of the two systems is very sensitive to the preference orderings of politicians, and whether the "action" takes place before or after the election has repercusions on the "ability" of the various types of representative democracy to reproduce the outcome of direct democracy:
1. If politicians care primarily about private benefits (lexicographic preferences), then the proportional system determines an equilibrium policy outcome that coincides with the median party's platform (and hence, if the median party's position is the same as thê See Morelii (1998a) for some robustness results on our prediction for majoritarian bargaining. This indicates the conjecture that the number of parties is always greater when the electoral system is proportiona] than when it is pluralitarian.
®See Cox (1997) , Feddersen (1992) , Fey (1997) , Palfrey (1989) . median voter's position, the outcome of direct democracy is obtained). The propor tional system allows'the median paHy to obtain the majority vote on: her preferred policy outcome because transfers cannot be used'for compromises in-this case, i 2. If instead politicians have quasilinear utility functions, an explicit trade-off exists be tween the two dimensions; thus, the equilibrium outcome of a parliamentary system with a proportional electoral system is the fruit of a compromise, and, is therefore bounded away from the median voter outcome.
3. If the electoral system is pluralitarian cthe equilibrium outcome", depends-almost-exclu sively on=the ex ante bargaining power of the political elites at the party formation stage, and the preference orderings matter much less. With respect .to the proportional system, the equilibrium outcome under plurality .rule. is~always .(at least weakly) more distant from the median voter position when preferences are lexicographic, while it might well be closer in the quasilinear case.'i. s i if . .
The paper is organize^follows: in'sectiori 2 we d^cribe the model; characterizing each stage of the game and defining formally the role of an electoral system; section 3 contains the main results for the case where politicians care priniarily about private benefits; section 4 displays all the equilibrium implications of the model for the quasilinear case, and section 5 concludes. All the.prpofs,are |n the appendix.
• Consider a set P of "political elites" (i = 1,2, ...,p), the initial 'players of the game, and assume p > 3. Each player i is characterized by a "position" on the policy space [0, l] .'^The p players form n coalitions, (Cv/Cq,': .C" : Ck DCj = 0, U?=i = P). Such n coalitions ' are the parties that face elections.® Party ,i's position is denoted by 6{ and is a weighted average of the positions held by the members of the party. Formally,, o _^j€Cî
In this paper we consider {only, one'dimension. >The extension to a multidimensional setting will be considered in future work.
• CaUing'political elites, the players-at> the ex ante stage and parties the actual players from the election stage on, is only a convenient distinction. In some contexts the initial players are actually parties themselves, and the actual players from the election stage on are joint lists; but the strategic interaction between the two stages would be exactly the same, so we will stick to the terminology in the text.
where Vj denotes elite fs relative ex ante bargaining power V' j = 1)'® We assume throughout the whole paper that for every possible partition tt (into n parties) of the initial players' set P, there is perfect foresight; every elite is able to solve the game in the same way. Voters (a continuum) are characterized by a distribution of preferences over the same policy dimension [0,1], and they are divided into districts (or constituencies). Knowing the ex ante bargaining power ipi and the ideological policy position 6i of each elite i, voters know the policy position of every party that might form, and since no contingent contracts can be signed, the true position of parties is the only relevant information for voters. For any configuration.
(1) of the n-dimensional vector of positions and (2) of the distribution of voters' preferences, the electoral system determines a distribution of seats in the Parliament.
Finally, for every distribution of seats there are expected payoffs for the n parties. These payoffs come from the majoritarian bargaining game that they have to play in order to try to enter a coalitional government.
Once the elections have determined a distribution of seats in the Parliament, the actual players of the game become the n parties, given the following loyalty assumption: 
Mathematical Definition of Electoral Systems
There are z constituencies, or districts, and C seats in the Parliament. For simplicity, we make the following assumption: Assumption 2 The list of possible parties to vote for is the same in every constituency. <^Geometrically, one could also thinkjof the domain^a rectangle, divided into 2 rectangles, where the area of each small rectangle represents the popiila'tion of voters in a district. Voting in each-district 'can be defined .as an'assignment of;a'fraction of votes E"-! p*-= .l)..for everydistrict i.and for every .party j, j =
The first-three, components of the 4-touple in definition 1 are clearly common to every electoral system, and hence in the analysis of the proportional vs. pluralitarian system .we-can cohcentrate-on the last element. '
•' .} . '
The Proportional System
The proportional system is characterized by the function:
The fraction of seats Wj is a weight, which determines the "bargaining endowment" of party j in any weighted majority game to be played in the Parliament after the elections. It is obtained as a weighted sum'of the results oiF each (district', where each district's weight in the overall sum depends on the relative population size.^^-
We call pluralitarian system a system characterized by the function:
•'1=1
Cis much bigger than n (many Parliaments have huge numbers of representatives) the .fact that we consider for simplicity all possible real numbers as possible fractions^of seat's is not too' bad an approximation, but it is indeed an approximation.'
Party j has to win in at least one district in order to have seats. The fraction of seats going to each party j depends on how many districts party j wins in, and on the relative importance of those districts. ' > "
One way to model mixed systems is to imagine that a fraction t] of the C seats is assigned proportionally and the rest following the pluralitarian rule. In this way the fraction of seats obtained by party j is as follows:, .
•
\»=i / \»=i / These intermediate cases are observed in the real world, together with runoffs and percentage lowerbounds. We ignore them here for simplicity. They will be introduced in future work.
!;
The after-elections Majoriteirian Bargaining Game
We now turn to the description of the game, starting from the legislative bargaining subgame.
Let us denote by q the quota for simple majority: g = If Wi > q for some i, obviously there is no coalition to be formed, and every decision, including the government formation, is taken by party i. The interesting case is therefore to assume Wi < q Vi.
A coalition of parties 5 is a potential majority coalition if and only ifd enotes the set of all minimal winning coalitions (MWC) given the vector of weights w.
n^W^js: Y,wi>q,'£wi<.gwcs\
The number of MWCs in 9.'^{w) is denoted by m(u;); M*{w) = {5 € i G 5}, and m*(ty) is the cardinality of such a set. The total amount of private benefits, or rents, associated to being in office, are normalized to unity, and they are distributed in equilibrium only within the prevailing majority coalition.
In the real world, parties share payoffs (ministers, portfolios, and other private benefits) proportionally to their bargaining power, which is usually related to the fraction of seats they own. In particular, Browne & Franklin (1973) show a strong empirical evidence that ministerial payoffs are usually shared proportionally to the relative weight of the members of The majoritarian bargaining' game used here is a sequential demand game, and can be described as follows:
1. The He^of-State (or Monarch) chooses the,first proposer, (usually.a potential prime minister) and the^rest of the order of play: ,'The Head of State is-assumed to choose the optimal order of play given.tits ,"super partes" preference ordering. In the case of indifference it r a n d o m i z e s . -. t i -2. For any order of play chosen by the Head of State, players make demands sequentially:
when the turn comes, (a) each player i demands a share x,-of private benefits (like a reservation price for its
participation to a majority coalition), and (b) in addition it, makes a policy proposal y,-.
When the game arrives to a node wHere it is'"fe^ibie"' for' the player'moving at such a node to form-a winning coalition with a'(weak) subset'of the previous movers; it can choose to'close such a coalition, or'else it can choose to make'another demand and let "For experimenii evidence on the fact that traditional sequential bargaining games attach too much importance to the'power bf being firet proposer see Bolton (1991) and Ochs^Roth (1989) .'
Randomization is usually assumed when only private benefits enter the utility function" of party members, because in that case every winning coalition in the continuation'equilibrium of every order of play'is as good as einy other for a "utilitarian" Head of State.' ' ' ' the game move-on. Closing a winning coalition is a "feasible'' option for a player only (1) if there is at least one subset of the previous movers whose total payoff demands do not exceed 1, and (2) if the parties belonging to such a subset proposed the same policy outcome.
3. Each party moves at most once: the game ends either when some player closes a coalition with some of the previous movers, or when all players have moved once, whatever comes first. If no winning coalition has been formed by then, all parties get a O-normalized outcome (caretaker government, new elections, or similar).
As shown in the next sections, this sequential demand game has a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, both when parties have lexicographic preferences and when they have a standard utility function. min(0t -^j)^-
The Equilibrium outcomes of the game remain equilibrium outcomes even introducing some form of strategic voting, but with strategic voting there could also be some other equilibria. We will discuss the possible changes when needed. We keep sincere voting because the emphasis of this paper is on the strategic behavior of political elites and parties at the different stages of the representative democracy game.
Notice that, since the position of a party on the political spectrum is given by the weighted average position of its components, a party Ci formed by many elites but disconnected^i.e., where some other party Cj holds a position in between those held by the elites forming Cj, could have the same policy position as party Cj and could therefore get the same number '^The term "expected" refers to the fact that the order of play might be chosen randomly by the Head of State, as long as the aggregate preference ordering is maximized.
of votes. This is why party coalitions are almost always connected.. In any case, given that voters' preferences are common knowledge, every party structure ;r is associated to a unique (n-dimensional) vector of,expected payoflfs; Given this mapping, we can now move to the first stage, where the party structure is endogenously obtained.
• '
The Peirty Formation Game i' • •
In our model the number n of parties in a given system must correspond to an equilibrium party structure, which we now have to define formally. Suppose that there are p political elites (finite number) who have to form parties (n < p). E^h elite i has, as mentioned above, an associated € [0,1]. The party formation game is modeled as a link formation game. Aumann & Myerson (1988) used a link-formation game based on Myerson's (1977) article on cooperation struc tures. Their gahie is similar to our first stage. One important difference, which does not concern the rules of the game, is that the subsequent stage game is described and. solved explicitly in our model, whereas in Aumann>Myer^on the individu^payoffs are basically a direct exogenous function of the cooperation structure, without any modeling of what may go on among the-components of the cooperation structure. Solving the subsequent stages of the game, we can attax:h to aiiy party structure a vector of expected payoffs, one for each party; but one of the felons to study the whole game'is to show how this mapping depends on institutional characteristics, ideology, and voters'preferences: ' ' ' " ' Let us now analyze the modeling "^sumptions. 'A graph'g (or cooperation structure, or network) on the players' set P is a set of p nodes and a set of links (non-directed segments).
A link between i and j will be denoted by ij. A component hof& graph g is a set of nodes (all linked to one another directly or indirectly) and the set of links connecting them. A graph is divided into disjoint components, as clarified by the following formalizatidn: denoting by T{h) the set of players corresporidirig to the nodes of a component" Aof a graph p;'
1. For all i,j e T{h) C F, j^z,,there exists a set {I'l,..., 1^-} C T{h) such that ii = i and iK = j and such,that €.h for all k = 1,..., K\ . .
®The second part ofthe definition is the one that guarantees disjointness. This definition ofcomponent is taken from Curranni>& MoreUi (1998), a.work on the efficiency of cooperation structures.
A set T(h) of players, linked in a component ft of a given graph, is called a party (denoted by C) if every player in T{h) is linked to every other player in T{h) directly. For any h £ g, if T{k) is not a party itself (because there are some links missing), then each player in T{h)
is a party. Formally; n{h)= 1 if^iJ,€T{h) ij e h |T(/i)| otherwise h£g and n{g) will denote the corresponding partition of the players' set in parties, or party struc ture.
The motivation for requiring direct links among all members in order to form a party is that the loyalty of party members in the Parliament to the party's policy platform (Assumption 1) is taken for granted by the voters only if every elite constituting the party is in agreement with every other elite in it (complete subgraph). Otherwise, when some links are missing, voters are assumed to believe that the party members will not necessarily be loyal. Obviously there are many contexts in which it is very important to consider incomplete subgraphs: for example, in the literature on communication networks it is often emphasized that when links are costly the best way to connect the members of a component is to do so with the minimum possible number of links. But when the subject matter is the formation of political agreements, it is not realistic to allow some members of a party not to communicate (and hence not to agree) with one another and yet let it be perceived as a party with a unified policy platform.
The expected payoff for party C when the political elites are in a cooperation structure g can be denoted by v{C\g)}^The imputation rule assigning-to elite i an expected payoff as function of the cooperation structure will then depend on the expected payoff v(C',g) for the party C containing i and on ip. The vector of ex ante relative bargaining powers ip, in fact, not only determines the party position (recall (1)), but also determines the shares of private benefits within the party. If links are costly, then each elite i has to subtract from the expected payoff just described the cost c{ij) 'foT every link involving i.
We now have all the ingredients to turn to the description of the game. Suppose that at the initial node of the game the players are all singletons (ff°).^^The players move oncê^S ince v is given only for a given set of institutions, preferences, and ideological positions, we should put all these things in .the domain of the function. The way g affects the expected utility of peirty Ci is through the mapping that the electoral system creates from g into w, and then using Ui(w).-But for simplicity it is better to analyze the first-stage game for a given configuration of those features of the political environment.
*^When a new cooperation problem arises, for example among countries, it is fair to assume that they start each, sequentially, according to some given protocol p : F -{1.2... .,p}. Each player has to choose which arcs (directed segments) to send. If and only if i sends an arc to j and viceversa the link ij is formed. Arcs that are not reciprocated don't count. Let us denote by a, the action (choice of arcs) of player i; aj denotes the arc sent by i to j. A strategy 5, for player i specifies an action a,-at each and every history where i has to move. Denoting by 2 the player in the i-th position in p, a history for player t is simply the set of actions ai flt-iEvery strategy profile s determines a graph p(s) and the expected payoffs attached to a strategy profile s are obviously given by the expected payoffs associated to 5(5). Since the game is finite the set of Subgame Perfect Equilibria is non-empty, and for a given p backward induction implies that generically the SPE party structure is unique.
Lemma 1
If c(ij) = 0 Vijf there exist multiple SPE profiles and multiple equilibrium graphs. However, one of the equilibrium graphs is alwaps the one composed exclusively of complete subgraphs, without superfluous links.
2. If c{ij) > 0 Vij, the equilibrium graph g* is generically uniquefor every p, and contains only links leading to complete subgraphs.
3. Generically, for every p there exists a unique SPE party structure.
Given this Lemma (proved in the appendix), from now on we can just talk about the equilibrium party structure. A feature of the equilibrium party structure is that the elements of such a partition, as already mentioned at the end of the previous section, are usually "connected" parties. To see this, consider the following simple example: Let the electoral system be pluralitarian, and let p = 3; let one of them have the median voter position. As will be shown in the next section, some party formation must occur in this case, whatever as long as none of the three players expects to win by herself. Notice that the party composed by the elite on the left and the one on the right could never win the election against the elite in the middle; they can at most tie. but only in the measure-zero event that the two extreme parties have exactly the relative bargaining power that allows them to locate themselvê xactly at the median voter position. But even in this extreme case where tying is possible, the disconnected party never belongs to an equilibrium party structure, because winning for sure is better than tying for anyone, and hence, whatever the order of play is, the middle from no agreement on such a new subject, and they start building up cooperation procedures from that time on. In the case of party formation it is clearly an abstraction, since a "reaP status quo would in general already display some long-standing coalitions. Before any election however it is very common to have at least some negotiations even within the long-standing coalitions about the policy platform to propose and the conditions to remain together.
player forms a party with one of the others, the one with the lower If the elite in the middle does not hold the median voter position, then in principle the disconnected party could win. But if political players care a bit about the closeness of the final policy outcome to their own favorite one, then the disconnected party would not form in equilibrium anyway, since the equivalent proposal to form a party by the middle player should always be at least as attractive. Assuming that the cost of forming a link is increasing in the distance between the two elites would capture most of these reasonings and assure .connectedness for every $. We can now generalize these and other important equilibrium features of our model, starting from the lexicographic case.
Equilibrium Outcomes with Lexicographic Preferences
Let us consider first the case in which politicians have lexicographic preferences: they first of all care about their share of private benefits, and then, for any given share, they would like a policy outcome as close as possible to their own. The Head of State is obviously indifferent among all the possible winning coalitions as far as private benefits are concerned. On the other hand, the probability of dissolution of a government coalition (about which all Heads of State care) is assumed to be decreasing in the "average distance" of policy positions within the majority coalition, and hence the Head of State chooses the order of play such that the average distance is minimized. In other words, denoting by r any order of play chosen by the Head of State for the majoritarian bargaining game, denoting by 5"(r), the equilibrium majority coalition and the equilibrium policy outcome prevailing given,r, the Head of State is assumed to choose r* such that iG5'(r') iGS'C)
when compared with any other r. Denote by 6m the median voter position and by 0^^-^the position of the "median party", i.e., the party such that the coalition with all the parties on its left and the coalition with all the parties on its right are both in (the set of feasible winning coalitions with the median party).
Proposition 1 Assume c{ij) > 0 Vij. For simplicity, assume also that m*{w(7r)) > 0 Vi, Vtt (no-dummy players).
If the electoral system is proportional and the politicalelites have lexicographic preferences, then:
1. The majority coalition S' is the minimal winning coalition with the minimum "average distance" from the equilibrium policy outcome: (6) ies 2. If S' is unique, tt* = g°(n* = p);
3. The unique equilibrium policy outcome is r(r) = V) Vr;
4. The unique equilibrium distribution of private benefits within the majority coalition depends on and if p^Z the two parties belonging to the majority coalition share equally the private benefits.
The proof of the general case is in the appendix. Here we can give the intuition by discussing the simple case of p = 3. Consider the subgame where n = p = 3. Whoever is the first mover, it can only demand 1/2 of the private benefits: in fact, if it demands 1/2+ « the second mover can undercut, demanding 1/2 + € -<5 (<5 < e), so that the third mover would choose to close the coalition with the second mover. Most important, the first two movers will also agree to demand as policy outcome. To see this, suppose that one of the two extreme parties-say the one on the left-tries to demand something closer to its position when it is the first mover; if the next mover is the median party it is better offdemanding her preferred policy, since the right party would prefer that to the first mover's proposal; if instead the second mover is the right party, its demand would again be different from the first mover's choice, and in particular would be one closer to the median party's position, so that the median party, playing last, would choose the second player. For all other orders the reasoning is the same, and in all cases the median party's position is the only equilibrium outcome. Knowing this, the Head of State would always choose an order of play with the median party in one of the first two positions, because otherwise the equilibrium coalition would be an unstable one with a left party and a right party pursuing the median party's policy. If the minimum distance is the one between the left party and the median party, those two parties will be the first two movers, and viceversa. Knowing this, and given that c{ij) > 0, no pair of parties has incentive to form a larger party, and hence n = 3 is the only equilibrium number of parties.
All the results summarized in Proposition 1 d^erve now some discussion.
1. There is no rigorous empirical work done on the ideological distance among the members of a majority coalition in different parliamentary systems, Hut some casual observations, among which the Italian experience after World War II, suggest that when the electoral system is proportional, (1) coalitions are always formed tx post after the elections, and (2) they are aJways very homogeneous. On the other hand, reforms towards a more majoritarian electoral system force parties to make joint lists ex ante, and the ideoi(^cal distance may be visible.
2. The fact that in a representative democracy with proportional electoral system there are always a lot of parties in equilibrium is consistent with Duverger's Hypothesis.
This result is robust to many variations of the model. If the Head of State had no discretion and could only apply the fixed rule of appointing as first mover the party with the relative majority of votes,then ?r* could be different from g°, since two parties who fear the exclusion from the majority coalition may have incentive to try to obtain the relative majority and hence become first movers. However, even in this case multipartism is confirmed: n* is always > 3. 5" would not be necessarily the one of (6), but rather it would be the one with the largest of the three parties and the closer to her between the other two; but still the two parties expecting to be called to move first would refuse to form a larger party ex ante. If one of the two extreme parties expects the relative majority of votes and hence the role of first mover, the median party expects to be called second, regardl^of who chooses the order of play, because the equilibrium outcome is the same and there could be only more instability in making a majority coalition with the opposite extreme party. If the median party is the one with the relative majority of votes when n = 3, then, in the very unlikely case that both the Head of State and the first mover are indifferent between having one or the other extreme party as second mover, one could think that ex ante the two extreme parties could have incentive to merge; but even in this case this would not happen: if the median party has a policy platform close enough to the median voter's position, the joint list of the two extreme parties would run the significant risk of actually giving the median party the absolute majority. Even with quasilinear preferences multipartism will be shown to be a robust equilibrium feature of proportional electoral systems.
3. The prediction that comes out from Proposition 1 is that countries with proportional electoral system and primarily rent-seeking politicians should display a low variance of ) and others, and with the experimental evidence on coalitional bargaining, as discussed above and in Morelli (1998a Morelli ( , 1998b ).
• Even allowing for strategic-voting, the equilibrium described here would stUl be an equi librium, because voters care only about policy outcomes-and here the latter is'always the median party's policy.'Only if the median party's position is -very^far away from the median voter's position, only in that case some forms of strategic voting would arise, but they would not alter the qualitative result.
Remark 1 If participation to the political game is costly for the political elites, then in a pluralitarian system the..number^of parties facing, elections, is at most 2. -(^uyerger's Law^. The equilibrium policy outcome, depends on the prqtocol^qf the party formation game, and may^welLbe far awayfrom the median voter.outcome.
The proof of the statement above is trivial. Suppose that the memiiers of any majority party formed ex ante can all benefit from participating to the elections. The players outside such a party would decide not to run though, for any small participation cost. A party not expecting to win would participate only if weintroduced some uncertainty and the probability
of wmnmg was not 0. When the alternative party is close enough in votes it may make sense to participate-and try. For ah equilibrium party structure to contain more than two parties when-the electoral system is pluralitarian, the'distribution of preferences must differ substantially among districts (as in UK seems'to be the-case,' allowing the Liberal party rigorous empirical analysis of this issue would probably require first the'extension-'of our model to a multi-dimendoiial setting,-and hence wehave to postpone to future research the confirmation and consolidation of our comparative conjecture.
' ' '^S ee Cox (1997) for a detailed discussion of the implications of closeness.
to survive)
Otherwise, if the distribution of preferences is more or less the same across districts, even with uncertainty it would be easy to show that the party formation game would never lead to more than two parties. Notice therefore that strategic voting, always used to explain Duverger's Law in the literature, is not necessary. The two-party system has to prevail when the system is pluralitarian even considering just the strategic behavior of political elites. Obviously, if on top of it one allows for strategic voting as well, the tendency to a two-party system is sharpened.
Which parties get formed in the party formation stage of a representative democracy with pluralitarian elections depends on the vector ip of ex ante bargaining power of the initial p players and on the order of play p. For example, let p = 3 and let the left political elite be the one with the greatest bargaining power, followed by the center one and by the right one; then, if the centrist elite is the first mover.in the party formation stage, it optimally chooses to send an arc just to the right-wing elite, and the latter optimally reciprocates, because the leftists would want too large a share. The equilibrium policy outcome would then be somewhere in between the center and the right positions. Thus, if political elites care primarily about private benefits, the proportional electoral system is the only one allowing a representative democracy to mimic the results of direct democracy.
Equilibrium Outcomes for the Quasilinear Case
It is important now to check how do our results change when using a standard utility func tion, where parties care both about policy outcomes and private benefits.The difficulties encountered when trying to obtain clearcut results for more than three players pushed so far most authors to anjalyze just the three-player case. Similarly, even though for the case of lexicographic preferences our model yields clear results for every number of players, in the quasilinear case we prefer to avoid cumbersome computations by focusing on the p = 3 case. I •
Majoritarian Bargaining vi^ith Quasilinear Preferences
Let the ideological positions of the political elites on the policy space be 0 < <^2 <^3 < 1-Let's assume now that these three elites haye the same utility function, linear in private benefits and concave in the distance between the realized policy outcome and the desired^S ee Laver & Shepsle (1994) .^M ost papers in the literature on legislative bargaining, including the seminal work by Baron & Ferejohn, deal only with the pure private benefits case.
one:
• . .
u; = Xi + 1-7(^* -5,-)^ (8) where 7 € [0,1] determines the weight of policy outcomes in the utility function. The total sum of transferable private benefits associated to being in a winning coalition is normalized to 1 as before. Suppose that the fractions of seats 'v}i,W2,103 expected by the three elites if they remain three parties are such that Wi < q Vi. Recall now that when player i moves (in the after-elections game) it makes a demand X{ and a policy proposal, which we denote by i/,-. A winning coalition can be formed only if the demands are compatible and if the members have proposed the same policy outcome. The Head'of State chooses' the order of play that maximizes the total sum of utilities, acting'^social-planner. -
Lemma 2 Consider three parties involved in a majoritarian bargaining game,^with policy positions 0 <^1 <^2 <^3 < 1 Q^d with a utilityfunction as in (8):
.1. If party 2 (the median party) is the first mover, then the equilibrium policy_ outcome is 6*~5i±2fz±5a. . party, 1 or party 3 is the first mover, then 0' = respectively, 2£a±|i±®2., depends only on who isjhe first mover, and not on the rest of the protocol, -s^.
2. The equilibrium share of private benefits'for the first proposer is less than or equal to 5, and converges <0^cs 7 goes to 0.
For example, if 61 = 0, $2 = 5,^3 ='i5 then the'equilibrium policy outcome is^-when party 2 is the first proposer, | if 1 is the first proposer, and | if'3 is the first proposer. If party 2 is the first proposer its equilibrium demand of private benefits is exactly | {equal split), while if the first proposer is one of the other'two players the equilibrium demand of the fipt mover is strictly less than unless 7 =.0., The majoritarian bargaining subgame can besolved, following the same backward induc tion technique used in the proof ofLemma 2, for any.number ofplayers, and all ,the qualitative results can be extended to the general case..Lemma 2 confirms, in contrast with most of the results in the literature on.nonjcopperative,coalition formation, that the<first mover never obtains more than half of the private benefits. If anything, it is the party in the middle of the policy spectrum that gets slightly more (both in-terms of private-benefits and in terms of policy outcome), independently ofwho is the first proposer: Now we can use this equilibrium characterization ofthe majoritarian bargaining subgame to analyze the impact ofelectoral systems on the equilibrium party structure' arid policy outcome.'
Duverger's Hypothesis and Duverger's Law
Proposition 2 Considerp = 3 political elites and let them have quasilinear utilityfunctions like in (8); 1. If the electoralsystem is proportional then the equilibrium party structure is = 1:2:3:
(n = p = 3).
2. If the electoral system is pluralitarian, then n = 2.
3. At the after-elections stage the majority coalition 1,3 can neverform in equilibrium. In the pluralitarian case, which induces coalition formation at the ex ante stage, $2î s a necessary condition for the party \,Z to have a chance to form for some order of play of the party formation game.
This result confirms that a proportional electoral system tends to foster multipartism, while plurality rules determine strong incentives to party formation before elections, reducing thereby the actual number of parties facing elections to two. If the number of initial players is greater than 3, then there may be some party formation going on before elections even with a proportional system, but never to the point of reaching the two-party system. The result that "disconnected" coalitions cannot be expected to form when the system is proportional seems to be consistent with the stylized facts, and it is in contrast with AustenSmith Sz Banks (1988). Only when there is heterogeneity of preferences, for example when different players have different values of 7, there may be majority coalitions with the two extreme parties, as shown by Jackson & Moselle (1998).
Equilibrium Policy Outcomes
For the lexicographic case the comparison of equilibrium policy outcomes is unambiguous, with the proportional system leading to a policy always closer to the median party's position than the pluralitarian one. In the quasilinear case the comparison is lessstraightforward, and depends on the relative ex ante bargaining power of the political elites. As in the previous section, let us use the three-player case in order to illustrate the main relationships.
Proposition 3 If the political elites have a quasilinear utility function as in (8), the com parison of equilibrium policy outcomes is as follows:
1. If the cost of forming a party is increasing in the distance between the policy positions of the elites forming it and if ipi = ' ip2 = fpz (equal ex ante bargaining power), then
• the equilibnum policy outcome of the representative democracy model is closer when the electoral system is proportional than under plurality rule, for every 7.
2. If 62 = Bmi for every vector of policy positions 0i,O2j^3 there exists a lowerbound s^ch that the equilibrium policy outcome of representative democracy 'is closer to the median voter position with a pluralitaridn sysiern than with a proportional system for every ip2> i>,y'
Even though the ex ante bargaining power, of,the political. elit^is exogenous in this paper, one could argue that,.if O2 =^mi a veryrhigh relative,bargaining power for the median party is very likely, since it is basically the one deciding.which party to form and .the others compete to be with her. Therefore, in contrast with the prediction in the lexicographic case, Proposition 3 suggests that if parties care about policy outcdmies and if the bargaining power of the median political elite is high enough," convergence'towards the median voter outcome occurs with a pluralitarian system.
:;Concluding> Remarks
• -As partis play a crucial role in the determination of public.^polici^, economists should care about the determinants of party formation and.party strategies. This is the first paper where the incentives to party formation before elections, and the strategic coalition formation after elections are clearly distinguished and where the party structure is one of the equilibrium outcomes. The process of party formation has never been directly introduced in the gametheoretic repr^entation ofparliamentary systems. Baron (1989 Baron ( , 1991 studied, self-enforcing party-like behavior, but made no explicit mention of when,and,why.the number and size of parties change.
•The second-importantxontribution of this paper-is the attempt to provide a formal model of representative'democracy'that applies to euen/electoral system. Besley and Coate (1997) introduced a simple model of representative democracy that is' specific to'systems using the first-past-the^post rule, while Baron' arid Diermeier (1998) provide a dynamic model of parliamentary systems valid only with proportional,elections. Since these two models are very different from one another, the results cannot be'compared. None of them can'be extended to consider'both electoral systems, nor to the explicit treatment of party formation'.-'
Our-model yields precise predictions about policy outcomes, niajority coalitions, and' equilibrium party structure; for every electoral system. -The comparison among institutions hinted -by our paper:'is-therefore particularly relevant for Eurbpean-'countries and-for any country-considering'a transition or a reform'in the'electoral institutions." ' •'
Consistently with empirical and experimental evidence, our simple model of majoritarian bargaining in Parliament does not yield a disproportionate payo^share for the first proposer, hence reducing the impact of the order of play on payoff distribution. With this realistic modification of the way legislative bargaining is usually modeled, and using a simple version of a link formation game for the party formation stage, the model should also appear very tractable and flexible. In fact, while almost all the papers in the literature have results only for the three-player case, most of our r^ults are already generalized, or easily generalizable, to any number of initial players. Besides these modeling innovations, the main results of the paper concern the relative performance of the two extreme kinds of electoral system in terms of party structure and policy outcomes:
to provide tools for constitutional designers. Finally, some new results could be' derived .on policy convergence: in fact, in the-absence of contingent contracts and-commitment power, convergence of the usual Downsian kind is less likely than-that obtained through party form ation.
• •
Appendix
Pwof of Lemma 1. . < . ' .. : , .,i .
Clfum 1 A necessary condition for a graph g with an incomplete component h to be part of an equilibrium, is that there must be no C{h) C T{h) such that, given V, the expected payoff v(i\g) Vi € C(h) is lower than the expectedpayoff if they formed party C{h).
The proof of Claim 1 is simple: if such C{h) C T{h) existed, then the first player :in C{h) according to p among those who send arcs (reciprocated) to players in T(h) \ C(h) can deviate by not sending those arcs, and everybody else in C(h) would optimetlly do the same in the continuation game. Using this Claim, let us now turn to the three parts of the Lemma.
1. Since the first-stage game is finite, existence of a SPE is not a problem. If c{ij) = 0 Vij,. it is obvious that many strategy profiles and graphs can be part.of.an equilibrium, as there are many profiles and graphs that lead to the same party structure tt with the same 0-cost.
In particular, we can easily show that if g' with superfluous links is a SPE graph, then the graph g' without superfluous links (with alKcomplete subgraphs) such that 7r{g[) -ir{g') is a SPE graph as well. The following argument suffic^:. call h € g' = g(s') the incomplete subgraph of g', i.e., the component of g' where some direct links are missing (but not all); the graph g' can be obtained through a strategy profile s' that differs from s' for the fact that i does not send arcs to any j € T(h), Vf £ T{h)y at any histbry;^'^but if s' is a SPE, then s' must be a SPE as well, since given Claim 1 the elimination of those arcs does riot alter the payoff perspectives of any player! 2. Suppose now that c{ij) > 0 Vtj. In this case, consider any 5 such that p(s) includes an incomplete component h with'some superfluous links. Such, a strategy profile s cannot be a SPE. To see this, take the first player in'p among those who send reciprocated arcs in h according to s-call this player if i deviates by not sending any arc to any j^T{h), this is a profitable deviation (giVen the positive cost of each jink) and no player .has interest, nor a chance given Claim 1, to interfere. could differ from s' also for some other arcs here there, and as long as links don't change theresults are unchanged.
3. Having shown that superfluous links can exist in equilibrium only when c{ij) = 0 for some ij, the last thing to show is that the party structure is, in any case, generically unique. In fsict, the only cases in which this finite game can have multiple equilibrium party structure is when some player is indifferent between reciprocating the arc of a player or sending it to another one, or when one player is indifferent between sending an arc to i or to where the weights' vector w' and the quota q' are the equivalent homogeneous representation of ty, If w happens to be homogeneous itself, then the share of each party in the majority coalition is exactly the ratio betw^n the number of votes it owns and the majority quota (proportionality). In the case of n = 3^Morelli (1998a) proves all the above, and provides other cooperative and non-cooperative models all leading to the same prediction.^®
The most important thing to show here is that for every r the unique policy outcome IS Suppose first that the median party is the first mover. In this case it demands the equilibrium share and its own policy platform. In equilibrium all the subsequent players (at least up to the point where a MWC S can be closed) have to demand their proportional share as well, and they are better off agreeing with the median party on the median party's policy position. To see this, suppose instead that some player i in S wants to deviate demanding ff^this cannot be a profitable deviation, and leads to the exclusion of party i from the prevailing coalition, because in the continuation game the other '^For example, if n = 4 and w = one MWC has 5 votes and the others have 4, and hence w would not belong to a homogeneous representation. But the vector w' -j is equivalent to tv, in the sense that the relative bargaining power of the players is unchanged, and is homogeneous. See Peleg (1968) for a precise definition of homogeneous representation of majority games, and see Morelli {1998a, 1998b) for more details and examples on the relevance and robustness of our prediction on payoff distribution in coalitional bargaining.^T hese results on payoffdistribution were obtained assuming u, = Xi. i.e., that legislators cared only about private benefits. But obviously they extend to the lexicographic case.
players keep asking their proportional share and ;hobody.derriahds B because it is bound to: lose against Now suppose that some other player i, different from the median party, is the first mover: is thercan equilibrium wh'ere-it can" propose"^closer than to and where such d is the equilibrium outcome? The answer is no. .In fact, suppose without loss of generality that 6i is to the left of (^t < then,' the'first'in r who has a position 9j >^/(7r») has a profitable deviation by demanding-^^/(^-), because.all the subsequent players with a position on the same side of the median party's position would do the same optimally.
So, the first mover and everybody else can be in the: prevailing MWC only .if iti demands'the median party's policy.
Given^1 the above, the Head'of State chooses the order of play so
that .the members of the 5* defin^in" (6)' are in the first positions, but the way this subset of players is ordered does not matter for the outcome.Moreover, if S' (from (6)) is unique, the members of 5* know in "advance that'they will be in the prevailing MWC, and hence none of them have incentives to merge with anybody else ex ante. By the same token, the players who know they willrnot belong* to the majority coalition because they have a position too distant from the median party do not want to waste resources forming a party with any other party either. Thus, if S' is unique, n* = pis the only equilibrium -number of parties. The only case in which some party formation can occur under a proportional system is when 5* is not unique,".'i.e.', wheh it is not" certain" which set" of players the Head of State will let play first. 
So, = §.
If playerS moves second, instead of piayer2, the procedure is obviously the same. The constraint for playerl would be W3(®i,yi) > maxti3{i3,y3) S.T. U2(x3,y3) > «2(a^i,yi)
The constrained max for playerS can be written as: 
^= 0implies (12) If^1 +^3 = 2^2 (which happens for example when O2 =^and the other two positions are equidistant from^2) then xj = § for every 7; otherwise it is less than that and converges to -(,^3 -^2)^Hi (^3w hich is always true because 62 >'Oi-All this implies'that between orders 1,2,3 and '2',l,3the social planner prefers 1,2,3.'Symmetrically, one could show following the same steps that the social planner prefers 3;2,1 to 2,3,1. Finally, i, 3,2 and-3, l,-2 can
• be proved in pretty fniich'the same way to'be strictly 'dbminated by all the-four options above. Thus, the social planner will always choose to place party 2 second in the order. Thexhoice between order 1, 2,3 and 3,2,1 obviously depends on the distances.$2 -Oi and^3 -^2«_ The of State chooses ,1,2,3 over 3,2,1 iff
As a result of all.the.aboye, party 2 knows that it-will belong to the MWC in any case. Whoever between 1 and 3 has the closest position to 62 knows.it will be the first mover and. that will belong, to the MWp for sure as .well. Then, since two players are not willing to form a majority party with anybody ex ante, the equilibrium, party structure is the three-party system.
2. If the system is pluralitarian, on the contrary, n = 3 cannot be an equilibrium number of parties: in fact, if n = 3 then all the seats would go to the party with the most votes and hence the other two players have incentive to merge. If 62 = then, depending on the exogenous order of play of the first stage game, either 1 forms a party with 2 or 2 forms a party with 3. The party 1,3 does not form because at most it would have probability 1/2 of winning, while the other two possible pairs lead to victory with probability 1. If^2 7^then there are parameters' values such that party 1,3 could form in equilibrium, but only if, in addition to having probability 1 of winning, c (13) is not greater than c(12) nor than c (23) . • , . -1. Suppose first that ipi =^2 = V's-In this case, recalling the assumption that the cost of forming a party is higher when the distance between the members is greater, the equilibrium policy outcome with a pluralitarian electoral system is either or Qn the other hand, we know from Lemma 2 that the equilibrium outcome with a proportional system is With a proportional system the distance from the median party's position is therefore jf the outcome with a pluralitarian system is , the distance from the median party's position is that is always greater than if the outcome is the assumption that 02 -Oi O3^62 once again guarantees that the distance from the median, party's position is lower in the proportional case.
2. If 62 =^mi the disconnected party 1,3 can never form in equilibrium, and hence the equilibrium outcome under a pluralitarian system is either or
The distance between the equilibrium outcome of a representative democracy using a pluralitarian electoral system and that of direct democracy tends to 0 as^2 goes to 1, recalling that +il>2-\-i>3 = !• Thus, if 62^which implies that the equilibrium outcome under a proportional system does not coincide with Om, there must exist 3^ŝ
uch that V^2 > pluralitarian system leads to an outcome closer to the median voter outcome than under a proportional system.
QED
'The equilibrium outcome is the former for sure if ipi <^3 and c(12) < c (23 
